Unemployment accounts by Setty, Ofer
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Unemployment accounts
Ofer Setty
12. April 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38064/
MPRA Paper No. 38064, posted 12. April 2012 13:29 UTC
Unemployment Accounts
Ofer Setty
Tel Aviv University
April 12, 2012
Abstract
Unemployment Accounts (UA) are mandatory individual saving accounts that
can be used by governments as an alternative to the Unemployment Insurance (UI)
system. I study a two tier UA-UI system where the unemployed withdraw from
their unemployment account until it is exhausted and then receive unemployment
benets. The hybrid policy provides insurance to workers more e¢ ciently than a
traditional UI because it provides government benets selectively. Using a structural
model calibrated to the US economy, I nd that relative to a two tier UI system the
hybrid policy leads to a welfare gain of 0.9%.
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1 Introduction
Unemployment Accounts (UA) are mandatory individual saving accounts that can be
used by governments as an alternative to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system.
In this paper I study the welfare implications of implementing a UA system in the
United States. The importance of such a study is reected even in the pre-crisis 2007
statistics: state UI programs paid $32 billion in unemployment benets to 7.6 million un-
employed workers1. As noted by Feldstein (2005), these policies are particularly important
because of their impact on macroeconomic performance.
UA work as follows. During employment, the worker is mandated to save a fraction
of her labor income in an individual saving account. The worker is entitled to withdraw
payments as a fraction of her last earnings (a replacement rate) from this account only
during unemployment. At retirement the residual balance is transferred to the worker. A
system of UA was implemented in Chile in 2002 and it is debated whether such a system
should be implemented in the United States and in other countries, e.g., Feldstein (2005),
Orszag and Snower (2002), and Sehnbruch (2004). In contrast to this system, the UI
system is based on government benets that are nanced by a payroll tax and provided
for a limited duration.
I study a hybrid UI-UA policy that combines elements of each of the two policies.
For simplicity, I refer to the hybrid policy henceforth as UA policy. According to this
policy upon unemployment the worker is allowed to withdraw payments from her account
at a certain rate. Once the account is exhausted the worker receives unemployment
benets according to a replacement rate as in a traditional UI system. This hybrid
system is conceptually di¤erent from a pure UA system in which no government benets
are provided to workers2.
1U.S. Department of Labor (2008). "Unemployment Insurance Data Summary," available at:
http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/data.asp. Accessed on October 27, 2009.
2A pure UA can be considered for reasons such as myopic agents and a government who cannot
commit to not bailing out unemployed workers with low levels of savings. In this paper I exclude these
considerations by assuming rational workers and government commitment. In such an environment a
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Figure 1. The UA System.
Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of the UA system for a worker who starts
o¤ employed, becomes unemployed and remains unemployed indenitely. The top panel
of the gure shows the balance of the unemployment account. The balance increases
gradually during employment and then declines gradually during unemployment. Once
the balance is exhausted the account remains at its lower bound of 0.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the deposits, withdrawals and transfers for that
worker. During employment the worker pays her mandated contribution to the unemploy-
ment account. Upon unemployment, the worker withdraws payments from the account
at a pre-specied rate until the account is exhausted at some replacement rate. From
that point on, conditional on unemployment, the worker receives unemployment bene-
ts according to some replacement rate, which in this example is lower than the rst
replacement rate.
pure UA policy is dominated by a Laissez-faire unemployment policy.
3
Unemployment tax
Employment
Taxes &
Transfers
UI replacement rate 1
UI replacement rate 2
Unemployment Time
Duration of UI benefits
Figure 2. The UI system.
Notice that in the UA system while withdrawals from the account are based on the
workers own resources, unemployment benets are paid from the pooled resources.
As in the UA system, I allow two tiers of payments in the UI system. Figure 2 shows
a graphic representation of the two-tier UI policy (henceforth UI) for the same worker
examined above. During employment, the worker pays an unemployment tax. Upon
unemployment, the worker receives benets proportional to her last earnings, for the
duration of UI benets. From the time limit of the rst replacement rate, the worker
receives unemployment benets according to the second replacement rate.
Two di¤erences between the systems should be emphasized. First, while the maximum
duration of benets in UI is xed, the duration of withdrawals in UA depends on the
balance of the unemployment account at the beginning of the unemployment spell, which
varies across workers. Second, in contrast to the UA system that uses a combination of
private and public resources, UI uses only public resources.
In order to study the welfare e¤ects of a shift from UI to UA, I build an heterogeneous
agents, incomplete-markets life-cycle model, in which workers face income uctuations and
unemployment shocks. Workers in the model di¤er along several key dimensions including
age, unemployment risk, income and wealth. Unemployment in the model is driven both
by exogenous factors (layo¤s for employed workers and search frictions for unemployed
workers) and endogenous decisions (job quits for employed workers and job-o¤er rejections
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for unemployed workers). There are no aggregate shocks in this economy.
In the model the government can implement either a UI or a UA system, each com-
posed of two-tiers. The UI policy is modeled as a choice of two replacement rates, and a
time limit of the rst replacement rate. The UA policy is modeled as a choice of a deposit
rate into the account during employment, a replacement rate funded by the mandatory
account, and a replacement rate used from the exhaustion of the mandatory account
onwards.
Given the unemployment policy, workers allocate their resources optimally between
consumption and savings. In addition, workers with employment opportunities choose
between employment and unemployment. The government takes into account these en-
dogenous decisions when designing the parameters of the unemployment system in order
to maximize the welfare of the workers. I refer to the combination of instruments that
delivers the highest welfare level in each type of system (UI or UA) as optimal UI and
optimal UA, respectively3.
Compared with the economy under the optimal UI policy, under the optimal UA
policy the unemployment rate increases and the tax rate decreases. These two e¤ects
can happen simultaneously because the UA policy delivers benets to workers selectively
and thus provides more insurance with lower resources. The e¢ cient insurance leads to
a decrease in precautionary savings under the UA policy. Since workers save less under
the UA policy they can better smooth their consumption over the life cycle. This makes
workers better o¤ under the UA policy. Quantitatively, the welfare gain associated with
a shift between the two steady states, measured as a consumption equivalent variation, is
0.9%.
From a distributional perspective, the welfare gain is positive for all deciles of initial
wealth. This means that the gain associated with a shift from UI to UA is not based on
3Formally, these policies are sub-optimal because they are based on a limited number of instruments
and they do not take into account the complete labor market history of the worker. Nevertheless, these
policies are inspired and closely related to unemployment policies throughout the world.
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redistribution from rich to poor utilizing the di¤erences between marginal utility. Instead,
the gain is due to an increase in the insurance e¢ ciency, striking a better balance between
incentives and insurance.
Yet, not all initial deciles experience the same gain, as it decreases monotonically
with assets. Poor workers are those who benet from the shift the most because given
their lower levels of assets they particularly benet from lower precautionary savings and
consumption smoothing.
To put the welfare gain of the shift from UI to UA in context, I compare the optimal
UI to two other policies within the UI policy set. The rst is the actual UI policy in the
US, providing a rst replacement rate of 50% for 6 months. The second is a Laissez-faire
UI policy, providing neither rst nor second tier benets.
Compared with the Laissez-faire policy, the optimal UI policy provides insurance that
increases both the tax level and the unemployment rate. This insurance leads to a welfare
gain of 0.4%. Compared with the actual UI, the optimal UI improves welfare by only
0.1%. Thus, the optimal UI can be seen as ne tuning the instruments of the UI policy.
The welfare gains associated with a shift from optimal UI to either actual UI or Laissez-
faire are small relative to the welfare gain of a shift from optimal UI to optimal UA. This
is an important nding because it shows that the welfare change following a shift from
UI to UA does not come from sensitivity of the welfare to the policy.
I show that the main results are robust to several forces that could theoretically a¤ect
the results. First, I show that allowing the option of deferring benets in the UI policy
does not bridge over the welfare gain between the two policies. Second, I show that
changes in the role of moral hazard in the model does not a¤ect the results. Finally, I
show that the e¤ect of general equilibrium prices, had they been present in the model,
would only strengthen the main result.
Related literature
This paper relates to several branches of literature. An extensive body of literature
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studies the design of Optimal Unemployment Insurance policies. These papers use re-
cursive contracts to formulate a parsimonious relationship between the principal (the
government) and the agent (the worker) that is based on the whole labor history of the
worker.
The seminal paper by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) shows that in the optimal con-
tract, benets should decline during unemployment, and the labor tax upon re-employment
should increase. These two mechanisms guarantee that it is worthwhile for the worker
to exert a high job-search e¤ort level during unemployment, because the outcome of em-
ployment is at least as good for her as the outcome of unemployment4.
The recursive contracts setting is the appropriate framework for characterizing optimal
contracts. One technical limitation of this framework, however, is the inclusion of workers
savings in this model5. For the analysis of UA, allowing workers to save is crucial because
savings determine the self-insurance level of workers in the economy. Indeed, the literature
has established that the addition of savings has important implications for the UI policy
(e.g., Shimer and Werning (2008), Kocherlakota (2004)). In addition, the importance
of long term contracts reduces signicantly when savings are allowed (e.g., Hansen and
Imrohoroglu (1992) and Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu, and Sahin (2002)).
Another important advantage of short-term contracts is that they are relatively easy
to implement. Indeed, the design of policies in this paper is closely linked to actual
unemployment systems throughout the world. Nevertheless, I am still able to adopt the
main insights of the Optimal Unemployment Insurance literature. In fact, Pavoni (2007)
shows that when there is a lower bound on the level of utility provided to the worker the
optimal UI policy resembles a two-tier UI system as the one I incorporate in this paper.
The literature on the UA policy includes several papers that compare variants of UA to
4Usually, this framework is used to study the unemployment insurance as the sole policy. Some
exceptions are . Pavoni and Violante (2007) and Pavoni, Setty, and Violante (2010) who study various
labor market policies targeted to the unemployed, called Welfare-to-Work programs.
5Abraham and Pavoni (2008) study a problem where agents have secret access to the credit market
or to storage. They use a generalized rst order approach, whose validity must be veried ex-post.
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UI. Pallage and Zimmermann (2010) use a full blown dynamic general equilibrium model
with heterogeneity in employment and wealth to compare the two policies. Their model
is based on one saving account that includes both voluntary and mandatory savings. In
this economy few workers let their unemployment accounts deplete. They nd that the
benets upon exhaustion of the mandatory account can be signicantly higher that those
under a UI system. This leads to more e¢ cient insurance and workers preferring the UA
system over the UI one.
Brown, Orszag, and Snower (2008) use a two period model to compare a UI system
with no savings to a UA system. Their model captures qualitatively the di¤erence in
employment incentives between the two. They show that UA changes the employment
incentives of workers and could achieve reductions in unemployment without reducing the
level of support to the unemployed.
Feldstein and Altman (2007) perform an accounting exercise based on the PSID data.
They show that a saving rate of 4% of labor income is su¢ cient for nancing the unem-
ployment benets of the vast majority of workers, leading to negative balances of only 5%
of workers at retirement, death or upon exiting the panel. In addition, they show that
the cost of forgiving the negative balances (which is the only usage of the unemployment
tax) is roughly half of the cost of the unemployment insurance system.
2 The model
This section has four parts. First, I describe the economic environment of the model.
This environment is invariant to the governments activities including the unemployment
system. Second, I introduce the government and explain in detail the unemployment
policies (UI and UA), the Social Security policy and other government expenditures.
Third, I present the workers optimization problems under each unemployment policy.
In these problems, workers take the unemployment system and its parameters as given
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and maximize their utility. In the fourth and last subsection, I describe the optimal
unemployment policy for each system as the choice of the systems instruments over the
relevant policy space that maximizes workerswelfare.
The model is rich in especially two aspects. First, workers are heterogeneous in several
dimensions including age, unemployment risk, wealth and income. This richness is im-
portant for analyzing the welfare gain or loss of various demographic groups. Second, the
model includes a detailed productivity process, government expenditures and Social Se-
curity transfers. These details are important for matching the net resources that workers
have over the life-cycle and across labor market states.
2.1 The economy
2.1.1 Demographics
The model is in discrete time. The economy is stationary, i.e., there are no aggregate
shocks. Workers are born at date 1, and live up to T periods. Throughout the life-cycle
workers face an age-dependent unconditional survival rate t:
The life-cycle [1; T ] is split into two periods. During age [1; TR   1] workers are in
the labor force and can be either employed or unemployed. I abstract from labor-force
entry and exit considerations since unemployment payments are conditional on being
attached to the labor force. During age [TR; T ] workers are retired. I refer to the time
span [1; TR   1] as the working age, and to the time span of [TR; T ] as the retirement age.
2.1.2 Preferences
Workersperiod utility is u (c)   Bq where c is consumption, B is disutility from work
and q is an employment indicator that equals 1 if the worker is employed and 0 if the
worker is unemployed or retired. Workers discount the future at rate : Therefore, workers
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maximize:
U = E0
(
TX
t=1
t
t 1 [u (ct) Bqt]
)
where:
qt =
(
1 if employed at time t
0 otherwise
2.1.3 Labor market and timing
Job Offer
)( tp
No Job Offer
)1( tp-
Accept/ Reject
Accept Reject
Unemployed
Unemployed
Employed Unemployed
Not Laid Off
)1( ty-
Laid Off
)( ty
Retain/ Quit
Retain Quit
Unemployed
Employed
Employed Unemployed
Figure 3. The Labor Market and the Timing of the Model.
Figure 3 shows the labor market structure and the timing of the model for employed
and unemployed workers6. An employed worker is laid o¤ and becomes unemployed with
probability  t that depends on her age t. A worker that is not laid o¤ decides whether
to retain or to quit the job. If the worker retains her job, then she remains employed.
The process for an unemployed worker is similar. An unemployed worker with an
unemployment duration of d receives at the beginning of the period a job o¤er with age
dependent probability t. If the worker does not receive a job o¤er then she remains
unemployed. A worker that receives a job o¤er decides whether to accept the job o¤er
6The model does not include a choice of intensive margin mainly because UI in most states in the US
does not cover part-time workers. See National Employment Law Project (2009): The Unemployment
Insurance Modernization Act: Filling the Gaps in the Unemployment Safety Net While Stimulating the
Economy. Available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/UI /uima.fact.sheet.jan.09.pdf?nocdn=1. Accessed
March 31, 2012.
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and become employed or reject it and remain unemployed. I discuss the observability of
quits and job-o¤er rejections later on, when I introduce the government.
The design of the transitions between employment and unemployment therefore allows
both exogenous factors and endogenous decisions. The presence of endogenous decisions
is a key component in the model as it implies that unemployment is determined within
the model and depends on the unemployment policy7.
2.1.4 Labor productivity process
Workers face a standard individual labor productivity process that accounts for a life-cycle
trend and persistent income shocks. The log labor income of an employed individual i at
age t is:
yi;t = kt + zi;t
zi;t = zi;t 1 + i;t
The rst component, kt, is a life-cycle trend that accounts for the return to experience
over the life-cycle and supports the hump shape of labor income towards retirement.
The second component, zi;t; is an AR(1) process with persistence , and innovations
i;t  N
 2
2
; 2

: The initial persistent shock is distributed zi;1  N

 21
2
; 21

, thus
allowing for initial heterogeneity in earnings already at date 1.
During unemployment, the persistent component of labor income is constant. This
formulation is useful for recovering the last labor income, which is the basis for unem-
ployment payments in both systems.
7An alternative model of the labor market would include a search e¤ort that a¤ects the job nding
probability (and possibly the separation rate as well). As long as the model allows for endogenous
employment decisions the results are expected to remain qualitatively unchanged.
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2.1.5 Initial wealth and savings
Workers are born at date 1 with an initial wealth of ai;1. The log of initial wealth is
distributed N

 2a
2
; 2a

:Workers can save and borrow up to a, and the periodic interest
rate on assets is r:
2.2 The government
The government implements an unemployment policy (either UI or UA) for insuring work-
ers against unemployment, a Social Security system for retired workers, and a government
expenditure.
2.2.1 The UI system
The UI policy includes three instruments (see Figure 2). The rst instrument is the dura-
tion of the rst tier benets, denoted by DUI : The second instrument is the replacement
rate, Q1UI , used up to the time limit DUI . This instrument determines for each worker
the level of benets during the rst tier of unemployment. The third instrument is the
replacement rate once the duration of the rst tier benets is completed, denoted by Q2UI :
The second tier benets do not have a time limit. All benets are taxable.
Following the UI policy in the US, UI benets are only provided to workers who were
laid o¤. Workers who quit are ineligible to benets. The implied assumption of this
restriction is that quits are observed by the government. This assumption is supported by
a component of the UI system called "experience ratings", that indexes the unemployment
tax rate to the layo¤s experience of the rm. Thus, a rm that reports a quit as a layo¤
would, in general, face a higher unemployment tax rate. This guarantees that the rm
has the incentive to report the truth. For more on experience ratings see Wang and
Williamson (2002).
Rejections of job o¤ers, on the other hand, are assumed to be unobservable by the
government. Compared with quits, rejections of job-o¤ers are hard to detect as they
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involve a third party that has no interest in reporting the job-o¤er rejection. Although
some monitoring of such rejections takes place in the US, Setty (2012) shows that the
average monthly monitoring probability in the US is 0.20. This is an upper bound for the
probability of observing a rejection because some rejections are undetected. I therefore
assume that job-o¤er rejections are perfectly unobservable.
2.2.2 The UA system
The UA policy includes three instruments (see Figure 1). The rst instrument is the
mandatory saving rate during employment, denoted byMUA: This instrument, which is a
fraction of labor earnings, determines the inow into the account. The second instrument
is the replacement rate, denoted by Q1UA, provided by withdrawals from the account.
This instrument determines the outow from the account. The third instrument is the
replacement rate once the mandatory account is exhausted, denoted by Q2UA: As in the UI
system, these second tier benets do not have a time limit. Upon retirement, the balance
of the mandatory account becomes available for the worker.
I assume that the mandatory account bears the same periodic interest, r, as private
saving8. Note that given that the return on the two assets is the same and that the
liquidity of the mandatory account is lower, the worker would always prefer to deposit
the minimum amount in the account, and withdraw the maximum amount from the
account.
The mandatory account has an upper bound am and a lower bound of 0: The upper
bound is used for technical convenience only and will be calibrated to a level that has no
e¤ect on welfare compared with a choice of no bound9. Relaxing the assumption that the
8The return on the mandatory savings could be di¤erent than that of the regular savings for at least
three reasons: higher regulation on the investment (to avoid moral hazard among other reasons); a higher
interest rate given the central management of the funds; and an overhead cost. I abstract from these
considerations and leave them to further research.
9Retirement is an important reason for saving in the model. Since the mandatory account becomes
available to workers at retirement, workers substitute regular savings with mandatory savings, without a
signicant e¤ect on the total saving level. As a consequence, the e¤ect of the upper bound on total assets
and employment choices is negligible as long as it is low relative to the desired savings at retirement and
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lower bound of the mandatory account is 0 and allowing workers to have negative balances
would generate another instrument - allowing workers to borrow against their future
income. This idea was suggested by Stiglitz and Yun (2005) and can be implemented in
the current framework as well.
I assume for consistency with the UI system that only laid o¤ workers are eligible for
withdrawing from the unemployment account and for second tier benets10.
The UA system described here is inspired by the UA system implemented in Chile
with the key di¤erence of the additional UI tier as opposed to a minimal transfer in the
Chilean system. Appendix A presents the Chilean system in detail and describes these
di¤erences.
2.2.3 Other government activities
In addition to the unemployment policy, the government administers two other activities.
The inclusion of these activities is important for setting the conditions that workers face
during employment and retirement.
The rst activity is retirement payments to retired workers. This activity follows the
two main principles of the Social Security retirement plan in the US. Specically, payments
are based on lifetime earnings and payments are progressive. The retirement policy in
the model di¤ers from the actual retirement policy in the US in the way lifetime savings
are calculated. Since lifetime earnings in the model are not part of the workers state,
they are approximated by the workers last observed labor income. This approximation
is explained in the calibration section.
The second activity is government expenditure, denoted G. The government spends a
xed amount on exogenous expenditures that do not benet workers. These expenditures
high enough as to not make continually employed workers eligible for second tier benets.
10Since the worker is using her own resources to nance the unemployment benets, it would be
interesting to examine the welfare e¤ect of relaxing the eligibility criterion of UI in UA. In fact, under
the Chilean UA policy workers who quit their job are still eligible to withdrawals under some conditions
(see Conerly (2002)).
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are important for setting the correct average labor tax distortion that workers face.
The government nances its three activities (the unemployment system, Social Se-
curity, and government expenditure) by collecting a labor income tax for either UI or
UA, denoted by UI and UA, respectively. Note that these two alternative taxes are not
decision variables, but rather used to balance the government budget.
2.2.4 Information structure
Mandatory savings are regulated by the government and hence are observable by both
the government and the workers. Private individual savings are unobservable to the
government.
2.3 The workers problems
2.3.1 UI
The workers state under the UI system is composed of ve components: age (t) ; private
savings (a) ; persistent component of labor income (z) ; unemployment duration (d), and
eligibility for unemployment benets (e) :
Workers in the model have two types of decisions. The rst type of decision is an
intertemporal decision of consumption and savings. This decision is based on a specic
employment state (employed or unemployed). The second type of decision is the in-
tratemporal decision of employment. This decision is relevant only for workers with an
employment opportunity (employed workers who are not laid o¤ and unemployed workers
with a job o¤er).
The values for the workers when employed and unemployed are WUI (t; a; z) and
V UI (t; a; z; d; e) respectively. These values are the outcome of an intertemporal maxi-
mization over consumption and savings. Note that the value for the employed worker
does not include unemployment duration and eligibility, which are only relevant for the
unemployed.
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The values for workers with job opportunities are given as follows. The value for a
worker who was employed in the previous period and was not laid o¤ is JUIw (t; a; z).
The value for a worker who was unemployed in the previous period and has a job o¤er
is JUIu (t; a; z; d; e). These values are the outcome of an intratemporal maximization over
a choice between employment and unemployment:
JUIu (t; a; z; d; e) = maxfaccept;rejectg

WUI (t; a; z) ; V UI (t; a; z; d; e)
	
(1)
JUIw (t; a; z) = maxfretain;quitg

WUI (t; a; z) ; V UI (t; a; z; 1; 0)
	
(2)
The value for an unemployed worker who holds a job o¤er, JUIu () ; is determined
as a choice between becoming employed (accept) and remaining unemployed (reject).
Note that since rejections are unobservable by the government the eligibility of remaining
unemployed (e) is carried unchanged to unemployment.
Similarly, the value for an employed worker who does not face a layo¤ shock, JUIw () ;
is determined as a choice between remaining employed (retain) and becoming unemployed
(quit). Note that since quits are observable by the government the eligibility upon be-
coming unemployed (e) is 0.
Using these values, we can now dene the value for the employed and the unemployed
workers based on the intertemporal decisions. The value for an unemployed worker under
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UI is:
V UI (t; a; z; d; e) = (3)
max
c;a0

u (c) + tEt

tJ
UI
u (t+ 1; a
0; z; d+ 1; e) + (1  t)V UI (t+ 1; a0; z; d+ 1; e)
		
s:t:
a0 = a (1 + r)  c+ x
a0 1 a
x =
8>>>><>>>>:
Q1UI exp (kt + z)
 
1  UI if e = 1 and d  DUI
Q2UI exp (kt + z)
 
1  UI if e = 1 and d > DUI
0 if e = 0
9>>>>=>>>>;
The worker in this problem decides on current consumption (c) and future assets (a0) in
order to maximize current utility from consumption and the future value. The discounted
future value is multiplied by the age-dependent conditional survival rate t: The future
value itself is a composition of the values of receiving and not receiving a job o¤er with
the respective probabilities of t and (1  t).
The rst constraint is a standard budget constraint where x is the government transfer.
A worker who is eligible for unemployment benets and whose unemployment duration
is within the time limit of UI benets, receives the rst replacement rate of the previous
labor earnings. An eligible worker with d > DUI receives the second replacement rate.
Finally, the ineligible workers transfer is 0.
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The value for an employed worker under UI is:
WUI (t; a; z) = (4)
max
c;a0

u (c) B + tEt

(1   t) JUIw (t+ 1; a0; z0) +  tV UI (t+ 1; a0; z0; 1; 1)
		
s:t:
a0 = a (1 + r)  c+ exp (kt + z)
 
1  UI
a0 1 a
Note that the eligibility state upon being laid o¤ is equal to 1. Also note that the value
for the worker includes the disutility from work ( B) :
2.3.2 UA
The structure of the value functions for the worker under the UA policy is similar to that
of the UI. The workers state under the UA system is composed of ve components as
well: age (t) ; private savings (a) ; mandatory savings (am), persistent component of labor
income (z), and eligibility for withdrawals (e) : It di¤ers from the workers state under UI,
because of the additional mandatory savings (am), and the absence of the unemployment
duration (d) :
These two changes in the state space of the worker reect the criterion for unemploy-
ment payments: in UI it is the unemployment duration and in UA it is the endogenous
balance of the mandatory account.
The intratemporal value functions under UA are:
JUAu (t; a; am; z; e) = maxfaccept;rejectg

WUA (t; a; am; z) ; V
UA (t; a; am; z; e)
	
JUAw (t; a; am; z) = maxfretain;quitg

WUA (t; a; am; z) ; V
UA (t; a; am; z; 0)
	
The value for an unemployed worker under UA can be written as follows, where m is the
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withdrawal from the mandatory account, and b is the government transfer.
V UA (t; a; am; z; e) = (5)
max
c;a

u (c) + tEt

tJ
UA
u (t+ 1; a
0; a0m; z; e) + (1  t)V UA (t+ 1; a0; a0m; z; e)
		
s:t:
a0 = a (1 + r) +m+ b  c
a0m = am (1 + r) m
b =
8>>>><>>>>:
Q2UA exp (kt + z)
 
1  UA m if am < Q1UA exp (kt + z)  1  UA
and e = 1
0 otherwise
9>>>>=>>>>;
m =
8><>: min

Q1UA exp (kt + z)
 
1  UA ; am (1 + r)	 if e = 1
0 otherwise
9>=>;
a0 1 a
The objective function that determines V UA () is similar to the one in the value for
an unemployed worker under UI with the necessary adjustments. Future private savings
in the rst constraint are determined by the sum of current private savings including
the interest rate, the withdrawal from the account, and the second tier benets minus
consumption.
The withdrawal for an eligible worker (m) is equal to the replacement rate of previous
earnings if the account has a su¢ cient balance. Otherwise, it is the balance of the account.
The second tier benets (b) are based on the second replacement rate and are provided
to workers who exhausted their mandatory account. Workers with account balances that
are lower than the second tier benets receive the di¤erence in benets. The mandatory
accounts balance in the second constraint is updated according to the withdrawal.
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The value for an employed worker under UA is:
WUA (t; a; am; z) =
max
c;a0

u (c) B + tEt

(1   t) JUAw (t+ 1; a0; a0m; z0) +  tV UA (t+ 1; a0; a0m; z0; 1)
		
s:t: :
a0 = a (1 + r) + exp (kt + z)
 
1  UA  c  (a0m   am (1 + r))
a0m = min

am; am (1 + r) + exp (kt + z)
 
1  UAMUA 	
a0 1 a
The budget constraint of the worker in the rst constraint of WUA () includes the
deposit to the mandatory account (a0m   am (1 + r)) : This deposit is equal to the deposit
rate, times the net labor earnings as long as the accounts balance is lower than am:
Otherwise, it is the deposit that sets the mandatory accounts balance at its upper bound.
Note that the labor income used for replenishing the mandatory account is taxed, same
as with the voluntary account.
2.4 Optimal unemployment policies
The objective of each of the optimal unemployment policies is to maximize the welfare
of the workers in the economy. The welfare metric that I use is constant consumption
equivalent, dened as the constant consumption c that solves:
X
E0
(
TX
t=1
t
t 1 [u (c) Bqt]
)
=
X
E0
(
TX
t=1
t
t 1 [u (ect) Beqt])
where fect; eqtg are the optimal consumption and employment levels under the studied
policy, and qt is the average age dependent unemployment rate under the actual UI.
When comparing two policies fi; jg, the welfare gain (or loss) of shifting from policy i to
policy j is measured as the consumption equivalent variation, dened as: ! = ci cj
cj
, where
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fci; cjg are the constant equivalent consumption levels of policies fi; jg, respectively. This
is the percentage increase in consumption that needs to be given to the average worker
at each date in her lifetime in the baseline policy (e.g. actual UI) to make her exactly as
well o¤ as under the suggested policy (e.g. optimal UI).
The average welfare at time 0 is weighted over the distribution of initial assets and
persistent shocks at time 0 with measures f0; 1  0g for time 0 employed and unemployed
workers.
An optimal Unemployment Insurance policy is a triplet fD UI ; Q1 UI ; Q2 UI g such that:
 E0

0W
UI (t = 0; a; z) + (1  0)V UI (t = 0; a; z; d = 1; e = 1)
	
is maximized,
where the expectation operator is taken with respect to initial wealth and the initial
persistent component of income.
 the government budget is balanced:R
t<TRAZd=0E exp (kt + z) 
UI =
R
t<TRAZ1dDUIe=1Q
1
UI exp (kt + z)
 
1  UI
+
R
t<TRAZd>DUIe=1Q
2
UI exp (kt + z)
 
1  UI+R
tTRAZDE exp (kt + z) g (z)+
G;
where g (z) is the determination of Social Security benets based on the persistent
component of labor income.
An optimal Unemployment Accounts policy is a triplet fM UA ; Q1 UA ; Q2 UA g such that:
 E0

0W
UA (t = 0; a; am = 0; z) + (1  0)V UA (t = 0; a; am = 0; z; e = 1)
	
is maxi-
mized,
 the government budget is balanced:R
t<TRAAMZE exp (kt + z) 
UA =
R
(t<TRAAMZE) b
 
1  UA+ R
tTRAAMZE exp (kt + z) g (z) +G;
where b is dened in (5) :
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3 Calibration
Table 1 - Externally calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Source/Moment to match
Preferences
u (c) logarithmic
Disutility from work (B) 0.4 See text
Savings
Median initial wealth $5,600 SIPP (1995)
Mean
Median initial wealth 4.2 SIPP (1995)
Interest rate (r) 4% (annual) Cooley (1995)
Labor income process
Persistence () 0.946 (annual) Kaplan (2011)
Innovation variance () 0.019 (annual) PSID
Initial wage variance (1) 0.056 (annual) (1968-1997)
Median earnings $2,730 (monthly) CPS (2001-2005)
The model is calibrated to match key moments in the US economy given the actual
UI policy in the steady state US economy.
The calibration strategy is composed of two parts. I rst cover the parameters that are
calibrated externally to the model. These parameters are expected to a¤ect both policies
in a similar way and are used here to ne tune the economic environment that workers
face. I then cover the parameters that a¤ect the consumption-saving and employment de-
cisions of the workers in the economy. These include the discount rate, the social security
payments, the tax rate, and the age dependent job o¤ers and separations probabilities.
Because of the importance of each of those four parameters I calibrate each of them to
match a specic data target.
3.1 Externally calibrated parameters
Table 1 summarizes the values for the externally calibrated parameters in the model.
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3.1.1 Life-cycle
The unit of time is one month. This frequency, which is relatively high for a life-cycle
model, supports a careful distribution of unemployment shocks. The survival rates are
taken from the US Census (2005).
Workers join the labor force at age 25 and are part of the labor force until they are
65. The retirement age of 65 is set to an age that is between the full retirement age range
in the US of 65 to 67 (depending on the year of birth) and the early retirement option at
age 62. The maximum age, T , is calibrated to 100 years of age11.
The life-cycle therefore consists of a working age span of 40 years (or 480 months) and
a retirement age span of 35 years (or 420 months).
3.1.2 Preferences
Utility from consumption is logarithmic. The level of disutility from work, B, determines
the optimal generosity of the unemployment policy. The values for this parameter in the
literature vary between 0:25 in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) and 0:67 in Pavoni and
Violante (2007). For the model presented here a level of B = 0:2 would imply a very
low level of moral hazard, while a level of B = 0:6 would imply a very high sensitivity of
the unemployment rate to the unemployment policy. In order to allow for the economic
forces of both policies to be active I choose an intermediate level of B = 0:4. I show in
the results section that the main results are robust to B 2 f0:3; 0:5g :
3.1.3 Labor productivity
The age prole (kt) is estimated using mean earnings with cohort e¤ects from the PSID.
See Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006) for more details. The income process is based
on Kaplan (2011), where  = 0:946, 2 = 0:019 (both annual), and the initial variance of
the persistent shock is 2z1 = 0:056. Median monthly earnings are equal to $2; 730, based
11For more on the Social Security timing see http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/agereduction.htm
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on the 2009 CPS data.
3.1.4 Savings
The initial wealth distribution is set in order to match two key moments of the assets
distribution of workers in the age bin of 25-34 years in the SIPP data (Anderson (1999)).
The rst moment is the median net worth of $5,600. The second is the mean-median
ratio of 4.2. This asset distribution implies a high Gini of wealth of 0.78 at age 25. The
borrowing limit is set to 0. The annual interest rate is set to 4% following Cooley (1995).
3.1.5 Actual UI policy in the US
The actual UI policy in the US varies across states. Nevertheless both the instruments
and their levels are fairly consistent. On average, UI benets in the US are based on a
replacement rate of 50% for a duration of 26 weeks (DOL, 2011).
3.2 Parameters that are matched to specic moments
Table 2 summarizes the values for the parameters that are matched to specic moments
in the model.
3.2.1 The discount rate
The interest rate r, and the discount rate , are the key parameters that determine the
wealth-income ratio through the determination of the average savings in the economy.
The wealth-income ratio target of 2.5 is approximately the average wealth to average
income ratio computed from the 1989 and 1992 Survey of Consumers Finances (SCF),
when wealth is dened as total net worth, income is pre-tax labor earnings plus capital
income, and when the top 5% of households in the wealth distribution are excluded12. See
12Note that given that the top 5% hold 54% of the net worth of wealth (Cagetti and Nardi (2006)),
the wealth-income for the whole economy is considerably higher. These 5% are of little interest for the
unemployment policy.
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Kaplan and Violante (2010) for more details. To match this target I set the annual interest
rate to 4% (Cooley (1995)) and adjust the discount rate accordingly. The resulting value
for the monthly discount rate is 0.9973.
Table 2 - Parameters that are matched to specic moments
Parameter Value Moment to match Source
Discount rate 0.9973 Wealth income ratio (2.5) SCF (1989-1992)
Average retirement income $1350 SS formula (monthly) US policy (2002)
Gov. expenditure/Income 10.1% E¤ective labor tax (0.29) Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994)
Job o¤ers and separations By age UE and EU transitions Shimer (2011)
3.2.2 Social Security payments
As in the US, Social Security payments for retired workers are based on the workers
lifetime labor earnings, which are not a part of the workers state. To approximate the
retirement payment for each worker, I simulate earnings paths based on the productivity
process, and regress the lifetime earnings on the last observed level of earnings. The
resulting formula is used to approximate lifetime earnings on the last observed earnings
in the model. The approximation is fairly good. The variation of the last earnings level
explains 85% of the variation in lifetime earnings. This is due to the high persistence in
the productivity process.
3.2.3 Government expenditure
The Government expenditure is set to match the e¤ective tax rate of 0.29 of Mendoza,
Razin, and Tesar (1994) for 1995-1998. This tax is split between the transfers of UI (2.3
percentage point), Social Security (17.3 percentage point), and government expenditure
(10.1 percentage point). The equivalent amount of government expenditures remains
xed throughout the experiments of both UI and UA. Therefore the government expen-
diture is the same in all experiments.
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Figure 4. Model First Moments.
3.2.4 Unemployment inows and outows
The initial employment level is set according to the unemployment rate at age 25. The
target age-dependent transitions between employment and unemployment are taken from
Shimer (2011). These values are based on the period of 1990-2005 from the CPS data.
Since these are a¤ected by both exogenous factors (separations and the absence of job
o¤ers) and endogenous decisions (quits and rejections of job o¤ers) I factor the data
transitions and use these as the exogenous driving forces for unemployment ( t and t).
I choose this factor such that the average unemployment in the model equals the average
unemployment in the data.
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Figure 5. Model Second Moments.
3.3 Model moments
Figure 4 shows the life cycle means of annual consumption, annual net earnings and assets
in the simulation for the actual UI policy. The gure shows that the model has reasonable
implications for these variables over the working age. Assets increase over the life cycle,
and attens at age 55. The savings at age 65 is used by workers as a bu¤er for retirement,
given the low replacement rate of Social Security. Consumption in the rst part of life
is lower than earnings. This is because workers save for precautionary reasons to insure
themselves against unemployment shocks and negative income shocks. In the second part
of life, consumption is higher than earnings as precautionary savings are less needed.
Figure 5 shows the Gini coe¢ cients of consumption, earnings and assets. The Gini
coe¢ cient of assets starts at a high level that is matched to the data and decreases
dramatically as workers with low assets save for precautionary reasons. Then it increases
following the labor market experience.
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Figure 6. The Employment Level in the Data and in the Model.
The Gini coe¢ cient of consumption is relatively high at the beginning of life because
poor workers who face either unemployment shocks or negative income shocks have too
little assets for smoothing their consumption. The Gini coe¢ cient of earnings increases
slightly over the working age. This is due to the already existing variance of the persistent
shock at age 25.
Figure 6 compares the data and model employment rate over the working age. The t
is a result of allowing both inows and outows of unemployment to be age-dependent.
The fact that the two employment proles are similar across all ages implies that the
endogenous employment decisions are somewhat uniform across all age groups.
4 Results
In this section I report the cross section statistics of the economies under the optimal UI
and the optimal UA policies and the resulting welfare gain. I then compare the optimal UI
to the actual UI and to a Laissez-faire policy in order to put the welfare gain in context.
I conclude this section with a robustness analysis.
To nd the optimal policy within each type of policy (UI and UA) I use a grid over
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the three instruments of each policy, resulting in 567 combinations for UI or UA. The
computational method is described in details in Appendix B.
4.1 Optimal UI versus optimal UA
Table 3 presents the instruments and the cross-section statistics for the optimal UI and
the optimal UA policies along with the welfare gain for a shift from the optimal UI to the
optimal UA policy.
Table 3 - Optimal UI versus Optimal UA
Instruments and statistics UI Instruments and statistics UA
Time limit of benets DUI 3 months Deposit rate MUA 6%
First tier replacement rate Q1UI 90% Withdrawal rate Q
1
UA 50%
Second tier replacement rate Q2UI 0% Second tier replacement rate Q
2
UA 40%
Tax level 29.7% Tax level 27.8%
Unemployment level 5.41% Unemployment level 5.74%
Welfare improvement from a shift from UI to UA 0.9%
The optimal UI policy provides a high replacement rate of 90% for a duration of
3 months13. The second tier benet for the optimal UI is 0%. The choice of the two
replacement rates in this policy takes into account that by construction all unemployed
workers are entitled to those types of benets. Compared with the actual UI, this policy
leads to an increase in the tax rate of 0.7% and keeps the unemployment rate unchanged.
The optimal UA policy is based on a saving rate of 6% and a withdrawal rate of 50%.
Figure 7 shows the average months of the coverage of the rst tier benets in UI and
withdrawals in UA over the life cycle. The UI coverage is the duration of the optimal UI
of 3 months. The UA coverage is equal to the average mandatory assets divided by the
withdrawal level. While the UI coverage is age neutral, the UA coverage increases rapidly
over the life cycle. This is a result of the ratio between withdrawals and savings relative
to the unemployment rate.
13The high replacement rate is possible since the transition from employment to unemployment is not
associated with moral hazard as quits are observed by the government.
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The duration of the withdrawals under the UA policy is a key variable of the optimal
UA policy. The withdrawal rate is nanced by the workers mandatory account and it
delays the government benets. This allows the second tier benets to be relatively high,
standing at 40%, compared with 0% under the optimal UI policy. This is especially signif-
icant since second tier benets are provided without a time limit. This high replacement
rate can be provided for a long duration since it is only granted to a minority of the
unemployed workers.
Fig. 7. The Average Number of Months of First Tier Ccoverage for UI and for UA.
Compared with the UI economy, in the UA economy the unemployment rate increases
and the tax rate decreases. These two e¤ects can happen simultaneously because the UA
policy delivers benets to workers selectively and thus provides more insurance with lower
resources. Compared with an unemployment tax of 2.3 percentage points (out of 29.7%)
in the optimal UI, the unemployment tax in the optimal UA policy, which is the tax
required to nance the second tier benets is only 0.3 percentage points (out of 27.8%).
These 0.3 percentage points are provided exactly to those unemployed workers who need
it the most.
In order to understand the e¤ect of the e¢ cient insurance on workerswelfare we
need to analyze the response of workers to the two optimal policies by looking at the
implications of the policy for assets and consumption decisions.
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Figure 8 shows the average assets over the life cycle under the optimal UI and UA
policies. The savings for UI are the voluntary savings, whereas for UA it is the sum of
voluntary and mandatory savings. The UA assets diverge downwards until around age
40. At age 50 most of the labor market risk is over and UA assets converge towards the
UI assets.
The e¢ cient insurance in UA allows workers to decrease their precautionary savings
for unemployment shocks. This is the case since the second tier benets in UA provide
good insurance against long unemployment spells that require high precautionary savings.
Note that other motives for savings such as retirement and income uctuations are kept
constant between the two economies14.
Since young workers save less under the UA policy they can better smooth their
consumption over the life cycle. This can be seen in Figure 9 that shows the life cycle
average monthly consumption under the two systems15. Quantitatively, the welfare gain
associated with a shift between the two steady states is 0.9%.
Figure 8. UI and UA Average Life Cycle Savings.
14The mandatory savings under the UA have a strong substitution with the voluntary savings for
retirement, as both types of savings can be used equivalently to nance consumption during retirement.
15The importance of consumption smoothing over time is also emphasized in Michelacci and Ru¤o
(2011).
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Figure 9. UI and UA Average Life Cycle Consumption.
4.1.1 Distributional welfare change
The existence of heterogeneity in the model across age, employment risk, wealth and
income, implies that the average welfare change already accounts for di¤erent types of
workers in the economy. Nevertheless, it is of interest to look at the welfare change of the
shift from UI to UA across initial wealth, which is a key source of heterogeneity in the
model.
Figure 10. UA Welfare Gain by Initial Assets.
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Figure 10 shows the welfare gain over the ten deciles of initial assets. Observe that
the welfare gain is positive for all deciles of initial wealth. This means that the gain
associated with a shift from UI to UA is not based on redistribution from rich to poor
utilizing the di¤erences between marginal utility. Instead the gain is due to an increase
in the insurance e¢ ciency, striking a better balance between incentives and insurance.
As expected, the welfare gain decreases monotonically with assets. Poor workers are
those who benet from the shift the most because given their lower levels of assets they
particularly benet from lower savings and consumption smoothing. Workers in the top
decile of initial assets are much less concerned about the unemployment policy because
most of their consumption is based on their assets rather than on their labor income.
4.2 Optimal UI in context
To put the welfare gain of the shift from UI to UA in context, it is useful to compare
the optimal UI to two other policies within the UI policy set. The rst is the actual UI
policy in the US, providing a rst replacement rate of 50% for 6 months. The second is a
Laissez-faire UI policy, providing neither rst nor second tier benets. Table 5 shows the
instrumentsvalues and the cross-sectional statistics for these two policies along with the
optimal UI. The welfare gain is calculated in this table with respect to the Laissez-faire
policy.
Table 4 - Laissez-faire versus Optimal UI and Actual UI Policies
Instruments and statistics Laissez-faire Optimal UI Actual UI
Time limit of benets DUI (months) 0 3 6
First tier replacement rate Q1UI 0% 90% 50%
Second tier replacement rate Q2UI 0% 0% 0%
Tax level 27.3% 29.7% 29.0%
Unemployment level 5.37% 5.41% 5.41%
Welfare gain relative to Laissez-faire 0.4% 0.3%
The Laissez-faire UI policy provides no unemployment benets (Q1UI = Q
2
UI = 0).
Note that the two other government interventions in this analysis (government expenditure
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and social security) are exactly the same as before, allowing an analysis of the specic
e¤ect of the UI benets. As expected, this policy increases employment and decreases the
tax rate in the economy.
Compared with the Laissez-faire policy, the optimal UI policy provides insurance that
increases both the tax level and the unemployment rate. This insurance leads to a welfare
gain of 0.4%. Here, too, the welfare gain is especially high for poor workers, standing at
1.1% for workers in the lowest decile of initial assets.
Compared with the actual UI, the optimal UI improves welfare by only 0.1%. Thus,
the optimal UI can be seen as ne tuning the instruments of the UI policy. Compared
with the welfare gain of a shift from optimal UI to optimal UA of 0.9%, the welfare gains
associated with a shift from optimal UI to either actual UI or Laissez-faire are small. This
is an important nding because it shows that the welfare change following a shift from
UI to UA does not come from sensitivity of the welfare to the policy.
Interestingly, a policy that is remarkably close to the actual UI policy gets very near
to the optimal UI policy, inferior by less than 0.05%. This near-optimal policy provides
a rst tier replacement rate of 50% for 6 months, exactly as the actual UI policy, but it
is followed by a second replacement rate of 10%.
Although the optimal and the near-optimal policies score almost the same welfare
level the distributional welfare is quite di¤erent. Figure 11 shows the welfare gain and
loss for a shift from the optimal UI to the near optimal UI. Compared with the optimal
UI, the near optimal policy UI increases the welfare of initial assets deciles 1-4, keeps
the 5th decile indi¤erent, and reduces the welfare of the rest of the deciles. This welfare
distribution demonstrates the tension between incentives and insurance in the model and
the sensitivity of poor workers to the level of insurance16.
16The rst replacement rate of the near optimal UI is consistent with the one that Chetty (2008)
reports. This replacement rate demonstrates the importance of consumption smoothing as discussed
by Gruber (1997). Specically, the observation of Browning and Crossley (2001) that the consumption
smoothing benet of UI is concentrated among a measure of one third of workers in the data, highlights
the importance of heterogeneity in wealth in my model.
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Figure 11. Optimal UI to Near Optimal UI Welfare Gain and Loss by Initial Assets.
4.3 Robustness
In this section I examine several forces that could a¤ect the results. I consider the following
three cases. First, I show that allowing the option of deferring benets in the UI policy
does not bridge over the welfare gain between the two policies. Second, I study the
response of the optimal policies to the level of moral hazard in the model by changing
the parameter of disutility from work. Third, I discuss the expected general equilibrium
e¤ects on the results.
4.3.1 Deferred UI
The better insurance that is provided in UA is driven by the information carried in the
mandatory account. This information allows the government benets to be conditional
on past labor history. In contrast, under the UI policy workers receive benets as soon
as they become unemployed. To demonstrate the importance of selectively deferring
benets in UI, I allow the UI policy to include one more instrument - the number of
months of delaying benets. Under this new policy workers self insure themselves during
the rst few periods of the unemployment spell.
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The optimal policy under that extended instruments UI policy is a delay of one month
in the benets followed by 0.7 replacement rate for 3 months and a zero second tier ben-
ets. Compared with the previous UI optimal policy (where benets cannot be deferred)
the welfare gain is 0.1%. This modest increase demonstrates the importance of deferring
the benets only to workers with good labor market histories.
4.3.2 Disutility from work
The disutility from work, B, is a key parameter that determines the importance of moral
hazard in the model. To understand the importance of this parameter consider two
extreme cases. In the rst case there is no disutility from work and there is no moral
hazard in the model. In this case providing insurance against unemployment in the
model has no adverse e¤ects and the resulting policy would be very generous. In the
other extreme consider the case that disutility from work is very high. In this case any
form of insurance would signicantly increase the unemployment rate relative to Laissez-
faire, which would be at least a near optimal policy.
Given that the optimal policies take into account the insurance-incentives trade-o¤
and given the importance of disutility for the optimal decisions I study the sensitivity of
the results to changes in B: This is of special interest given the big range of values used
for this parameter in the literature, as described in the calibration above.
The two levels of B that I choose are f0:3; 0:5g. For each of those levels the three
parameters of discount factor, government expenditure and endogenous versus exogenous
labor market decisions need to be adjusted. The forth matched moment (Social Security
formula) is not sensitive to these changes. The results are summarized in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 5 - B=0.3 Optimal UI versus Optimal UA, Actual UI and Laissez-faire
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Instruments and statistics Optimal UI Optimal UA Actual UI LF
Instrument 1 DUI = 3 MUA = 0:06 DUI = 6 DUI = 0
Instrument 2 Q1UI = 0:9 Q
1
UA = 0:5 Q
1
UI = 0:5 Q
1
UI = 0
Instrument 3 Q2UI = 0:0 Q
2
UA = 0:4 Q
2
UI = 0:0 Q
2
UI = 0
Tax level 29.7% 27.7% 29.0% 27.2%
Unemployment level 5.41% 5.57% 5.41% 5.40%
Welfare change* 0.7% -0.2% -0.5%
* Relative to optimal UI
Table 6 - B=0.5 Optimal UI versus Optimal UA, Actual UI and Laissez-faire
Instruments and statistics Optimal UI Optimal UA Actual UI LF
Instrument 1 DUI = 2 MUA = 0:05 DUI = 6 DUI = 0
Instrument 2 Q1UI = 0:9 Q
1
UA = 0:5 Q
1
UI = 0:5 Q
1
UI = 0
Instrument 3 Q2UI = 0:1 Q
2
UA = 0:3 Q
2
UI = 0:0 Q
2
UI = 0
Tax level 28.8% 27.3% 29.0% 26.9%
Unemployment level 4.71% 4.87% 5.41% 4.58%
Welfare change* 1.2% -0.8% -0.1%
* Relative to optimal UI
When B = 0:3, the actual UI results in a welfare score that is close to the optimal UI,
whereas the Laissez-faire policy does relatively poorly. When B = 0:5, the ranking ips,
with actual UI being too generous and Laissez-faire becomes a near optimal policy.
The modications in the optimal UI and UA policies are minor. The policies for
B = 0:3 is the same as the optimal UI for B = 0:4. The optimal UI for B = 0:5 provides
the high replacement rate for only two months, but it is followed by a replacement rate
of 10%. The optimal UA provides a lower second tier benet but also requires a lower
deposit.
The welfare gain from optimal UI to optimal UA increases with disutility. This is
because when the importance of incentives is increasing, so does the importance of ef-
cient insurance. Note, however, that if disutility was very high, both policies would
converge towards the Laissez-faire policy. Such levels of disutility may be counterfactual,
as already at B = 0:5, the actual UI policy is responsible for almost 1 percentage point
of unemployment, calculated as the di¤erence between the unemployment rate under the
actual UI and that under the Laissez-faire policy.
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4.3.3 General equilibrium e¤ects
Closing the model by endogenizing prices (interest rate and wage for e¢ ciency unit) is
straightforward. Unfortunately, the computational requirements for the current model
are already challenging. This is because each combination of instruments for each policy
requires solving for the optimal decisions for all types of workers and nding the tax level
that balances the government budget.
It is possible, however, to look at the di¤erences in the quantity of labor and assets
and to study the expected e¤ects on prices under the optimal UI and UA policies. Both
labor supply and the level of assets are determined in the model by the level of insurance
provided (the assets also depend on retirement but this is the same under both policies).
As shown above, both labor supply and assets are lower in UA compared to UI.
Therefore, the general equilibrium e¤ects of endogenous prices, had they been present in
the model, would further increase the welfare gain associated with the shift from UI to
UA17.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper I study a hybrid UA-UI policy that combines elements from both policies.
According to this policy an unemployed worker rst uses her own mandatory account
for payments. Then, when the account is exhausted she receives unemployment benets
from the government. This novel policy provides benets to workers based on their labor
market history and thus simultaneously supports more insurance with lower taxes.
When comparing the two optimal policies, a shift from UI to UA leads to an average
welfare gain of 0.9% of lifetime consumption. This shift makes workers in all deciles
17The prices (wage and interest rate) would increase because labor supply and assets are lower under
UA. The government can guarantee the same welfare of the partial equilibrium UA, by collecting capital
and increasing the labor tax such that the resulting prices would be equal to those in the partial equi-
librium. In this economy workers would make the same decisions as in the partial equilibrium economy
and left with the additional tax proceedings.
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of initial wealth better o¤. Poor workers gain the most because they benet the most
from the ability to save less for precautionary motives and thus better smooth their
consumption over the life cycle.
Since the policy uses the accounts to learn about the employment history of workers it
seems that a more appropriate title for the hybrid policy would be Employment Accounts.
In fact, a possible implementation of this principle could be based on ctitious accounts
that carry the same information as actual accounts with the advantage that the saving
decisions are not enforced.
A complementary policy to the one presented here is allowing workers to borrow
against their future labor income as proposed by Stiglitz and Yun (2005). Since their
paper is mostly qualitative, the framework in this paper can be used to assess the optimal
level and the welfare gain resulting from such an instrument.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARISON OF UA IN THE MODEL WITH THE CHILEAN
SYSTEM
Figure 12 describes the Chilean UA system for workers with open-ended contracts18.
Both the employee and the employer provide monthly contributions to the UA system.
The employer pays the majority of the contribution (2.4% of earnings) and the worker
pays an additional 0.6% of her earnings. About 75% of the contribution (2.2% out of the
3%) is deposited in the workers mandatory account. The remaining of the contribution
(0.8% out of 3%) is deposited in the common fund. Upon unemployment, workers are
entitled to a schedule of payments that starts at a replacement rate of 50% and decreases
linearly to 30% over 5 months. These payments are rst nanced from the mandatory
account. If the account of an unemployed worker is exhausted before the schedule is over,
then payments are provided from the common fund.
In the Chilean system the UA withdrawals are followed by a minimum benet, while in
the hybrid policy the withdrawals are followed by UI payments indexed to previous
earnings. In addition, the withdrawals from the account during unemployment are
constant in the model (they decline in the Chilean policy). This assumption, which
simplies the policy space, is motivated by several recent papers that nd that when
savings are allowed the importance of declining benets decreases signicantly, e.g.
Shimer and Werning (2008), Kocherlakota (2004), and Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu, and
Sahin (2002).
18The rules of savings and withdrawals for xed-term contracts are slightly di¤erent. For an overview
of the Chilean UA system see Sehnbruch (2004) and "Unemployment insurance in Chile: Reform and
innovation", 2009, International Social Security Association.
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Employee
Payment:
0.6% of wages
0.6%
Individual
Accounts
Employer
Payment:
2.4% of wages
0.8%
Joint
Accounts
1.6%
Unemployment
Benefits: 30-50% of
past earnings for up
to 5 months
At retirement,
balance goes to
individuals’ Social
Security Accounts
Pay Benefits for
those with Low-
Individual Account
Balances
Source: NCPA, Brief Analysis, No. 424, 2002
Figure 12. The Chilean UA Aystem.
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
APPENDIX B: COMPUTATIONAL METHOD
This appendix describes the computational method of the model. It includes three
parts. First, I describe the solution method for the workersproblems for a given UI.
Second, I explain how I measure the cross-sectional moments that result from the workers
decisions. Third, I describe the solution method for the optimal UI policy given the cross-
sectional moments calculated in the second part.
The computational method for the UA problems and the optimal UA policy follow
the same principles with the necessary adjustments
1. Solving the workersproblems
I describe here the solution of the workers problems under UI for the working age.
The solution for the retirement age is a simple special case of the one for working
age with a smaller state space. The solution to the UA problem follows the same
steps with the appropriate modications.
(a) The state space
The workers state under UI is: age (t) ; private savings (a) ; persistent com-
ponent of labor income (z) ; unemployment duration (d), and eligibility for
unemployment benets (e) :
The state space of age is f1; 2; :::; 480g because the unit of time in the model
is one month. The state space of unemployment duration is f1; 2:::; DUI + 1g,
because unemployment duration becomes irrelevant past the time limit of UI
benets. The state space of eligibility for unemployment benets is f0; 1g :
The other two variables, private savings (a) ; and persistent component of labor
income (z) are continuous. These two variables are discretized linearly over the
intervals [a; a] and [z; z], respectively.
a equal to zero is the borrowing limit, a is equal to $900,000 so that workers
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never exceed that level of assets (to avoid unnecessary extrapolations).
The highest and lowest grid points of z are: 3zi;1 +
p
t  1; where 2zi;1
is the variance of the initial wage and 2 is the variance of labor productivity
innovations (see the calibration part for the values). The rest of the grid values
are spread linearly across [z; z] :
Using 65 values for the grid of assets and 5 values for the grid of the persistent
component of labor income, the size of the state space for the workers problem
under the actual UI policy is 2,184,000. This is only the ball park of the num-
ber of problems that needs to be solved for two reasons. First, the state space
increases with the time limit of the UI policy. Second, the unique number of
problems is smaller than the size of the state space since some of the workers
problems over the state space are identical (e.g., the unemployment duration
is meaningless for an ineligible worker).
(b) Solving the workers problems
For each possible state over the state space described above, I rst solve the
intertemporal decisions of consumption - savings for (1) the employed and (2)
the unemployed workers with a job opportunity and for (3) the worker with
no job opportunity. These are three standard problems in which the labor
income or benets are well dened19. Note that since I am using dynamic
programming, the future value is already known for each point on the state
space.
(c) Solution method
For the solution of the three standard problems I use the Endogenous Grid
Method (EGM), developed by Carroll (2006). According to the EGM the grid
of assets is taken over future assets rather than current assets. This reformu-
19Note that the state of the persistent component of labor income is the net one. This means that the
tax level in the economy is not required for solving the workers problems.
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lation of the problem reduces the computational burden signicantly. For a
more detailed description of this method as well as a comparison of computa-
tion time between EGM and Value Function Iteration (VFI) see Barillas and
Fernandez-Villaverde (2007). My own experience with using the VFI method
for previous versions of the model supports these ndings, and I believe that
the EGM played a key role in solving the big state-space model in a reasonable
time.
The computation of the employment decision for employed and unemployed
workers with job opportunities are trivial and is described in the model part
of the paper.
2. Cross section moments
(a) Initial state
In order to calculate the relevant cross section moments of the economy (for a
given UI policy) I start with an initial guess for the tax UI1 and simulate one
cohort of N = 15000 workers over dates f1; 2; :::; Tg. Note that these workers
face survival shocks so the size of the population decreases with age.
The initial state of workers (employment status, income, and assets) and the
income and unemployment shocks, are drawn from the relevant distributions,
as explained in the calibration section above.
For each worker and for each date (as long as the worker is alive), I collect data
on taxes and transfers (including UI benets, Social Assistance, and Social
Security).
(b) Updating the tax rate
The statistics on transfers together with the per capita government expenditure
determine the governments expenditure, denoted by EG: The governments
income IG is simply the sum of tax income over all workers at all ages. As
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long as jEG   IGj > ", I adjust the tax rate as follows. Given a tax guess UIm ;
if EG   IG > "; then UIm+1 = UIm 
q
EG
IG
: Otherwise, if EG   IG < "; then
UIm+1 = 
UI
m 
q
IG
EG
: I use a square root of the expenditure-income ratio to
avoid big jumps in the tax level. I also use bounds on the ratio at f0:5; 2:0g to
avoid overshoots.
(c) Calculating moments
When the government budget is balanced according to the conversion criterion
above, I calculate the rest of the moments of the model, including average
monthly consumption, earnings, assets, and employment, and the Gini coe¢ -
cient for consumption, earnings, and assets. In addition, I calculate the average
utility per worker in the economy (over the working age and the retirement age).
3. The optimal policy
The process described so far gives the moments of a stationary economy given a UI
policy. In order to choose the optimal UI policy I follow these steps:
(a) The UI policy grid
Dene the UI policy grid asDUI 2 DUI  f0; 1; :::; 8g ; Q1UI 2 Q1UI  f0:1; 0; 2:::; 0:9g ;
Q2UI 2 Q2UI  f0:0; 0; 1:::; 0:6g. Therefore there 567 possible policies.
(b) Solve for all policy grid points
8DUI 2 DUI ; QUI 2 QUI repeat steps (1) and (2) above.
(c) The optimal policy
The optimal policy is the policy that maximizes the average ex-ante utility of
workers. It is always veried that it is not a corner solution in terms of the
instruments.
A note on computational time
Running one UI policy node on a two Intel Xeon Quad-Core 64-bit processor, running
49
at 2.33GHz takes about 30 minutes. The solution of one UA policy node takes about 60
minutes (the size of the state space is bigger because of the continuous am component).
In order to solve each calibration in a reasonable time I have used "Union Square",
which is a multi-purpose high performance computing resource for the NYU research
community, and later on the Condor system at Tel Aviv University.
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